

# **Cog468 "Cognitive Science Capstone Seminar" Second Notes Assignment**

## **PRIMARY SOURCES**

### **1. Signs and Meaning in the Cinema**

1. "The study of film must keep pace with and be responsive to changes and developments in the study of other media, other arts, other modes of communication and expression. For much too long film aesthetics and film criticism, in the Anglo-Saxon countries at least, have been privileged zones, private reserves in which thought has developed along its own lines, haphazardly, irrespective of what goes on in the larger realm of ideas. Writers about the cinema have felt free to talk about film language as if linguistics did not exist and to discuss Eisenstein's theory of montage in blissful ignorance of the Marxist concept of dialectic." (P. 17)
2. "in sociology, emphasized that signs must be studied from a social viewpoint, that language was a social institution which eluded the individual will. The linguistic system-what might nowadays be called the 'code'-pre-existed the individual act of speech, the 'message'. Study of the system therefore had logical priority... Saussure stressed, as his first principle, the arbitrary nature of the sign. The signifier (the sound-image o-k-s or b-6-f, for example) has no natural connection with the signified (the concept 'ox'). To use Saussure's term, the sign is 'unmotivated'. Saussure was not certain what the full implications of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign were for semiology." (P.117)
3. "Roland Barthes, \* as a result of his researches into the language of costume, concluded that it was impossible to escape the pervasive presence of verbal language. Words enter into discourse of another order either to fix an ambiguous meaning, like a label or a title, or to contribute to the meaning that cannot otherwise be communicated, like the words in the bubbles in a strip-cartoon. Words either anchor meaning or convey it." (P.118)
4. "Yet our experience of cinema suggests that great complexity of meaning can be expressed through images. Thus, to take an obvious example, the most trivial and banal book can be made into an extremely interesting and, to all appearances, significant film; reading a screenplay is usually a barren and arid experience, intellectually as well as emotionally. The implication of this is that it is not only systems exclusively 'grounded on the arbitrariness of the sign' which are expressive and meaningful. 'Natural signs' cannot be so readily dismissed as Saussure imagined." (P.120)
5. "Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, are very instructive, because we know that in certain respects they are exactly like the objects they represent. But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to

nature. In that aspect then, they belong to the second class of signs, those by physical connection.” (P. 123-124) – Mental Representation

## **2. Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema**

1. “One of the most important of the many problems in film theory is that of the impression of reality experienced by the spectator. Films give us the feeling that we are witnessing an almost real spectacle— to a much greater extent, as Albert Laffay has noted, than does a novel, a play, or a figurative painting \* Films release a mechanism of affective and perceptual participation in the spectator (one is almost never totally bored by a movie). They spontaneously appeal to his sense of belief—never, of course, entirely, but more intensely than do the other arts, and occasionally films are, even in the absolute, very convincing. They speak to us with the accents of true evidence, using the argument that "It is so." With ease they make the kind of statements a linguist would call fully assertive and which, moreover, are usually taken at face value.” (P.4)
2. “What we call the "meaning" of the event narrated by the filmmaker would in any case have a meaning for someone (since no others exist). But from the point of view of the means of expression, one can distinguish between the "natural" meaning of things and beings (which is continuous, total, and without distinct signifiers: the expression of joy on the face of a child) and determined signification. The latter would be inconceivable if we did not live in a world of meaning; it is conceivable only as a distinct organizational act by which meaning is reorganized: Signification tends to make precise slices of discontinuous significates corresponding to so many discrete signifiers” (P.37)
3. “The rule of the "story" is so powerful that the image, which is said to be the major constituent of film, vanishes behind the plot it has woven—if we are to believe some analyses—so that the cinema is only in theory the art of images. Film, which by nature one would think adapted to a transversal reading, through the leisurely investigation of the visual content of each shot, becomes almost immediately the subject of a longitudinal reading, which is precipitous, "anxious," and concerned only with "what's next." The sequence does not string the individual shots; it suppresses them.” (P. 45)
4. “The difference between the natural object and its reconstructed model is insisted upon, but somehow it is neutralized; the optional or individual variations of articulation in phonemics, for example, are "nonrelevant." The goal of the reconstruction, as Roland Barthes emphasizes, is not to reproduce reality; the reconstruction is not a reproduction, it does not attempt to imitate the concrete aspect of the original object; it is neither poesis nor pseudo-physis, but a simulation, a product of techne.<sup>10</sup> That is to say: the result of a manipulation. As the structural skeleton of the object made into a second object, it remains a kind of prosthesis” (P.36)
5. “the "phenomenological" angle: A sequence of film, like a spectacle from life, carries its meaning within itself. The signifier is not easily distinguished from the significate. "It is the felicity of art to show how a thing begins to signify, not by

reference to ideas that are already formed or acquired, but by the temporal and spatial arrangement of elements."29 This is an entirely new concept of ordering. The cinema is the "phenomenological" art par excellence, the signifier is coextensive with the whole of the significate, the spectacle its own signification, thus short-circuiting the sign itself" (P.43)

### **3. The Symbolic Relationship Between Semiotics and Cinema**

1. "semiotic theory espouses the idea that there's no actual relationship between the signifier and the signified. This means that the word "dog," the signifier, doesn't actually have anything to do with your four-legged furry friend, the signified, it's just an interpretation we've come up with. When you read that word in quotations above, your mind interpreted the image of a dog because that is what you've been trained to do by language."
2. "To go even deeper, semiotic theory breaks down signifiers or signs into three sub-classifications: the icon (something that represents an object by resembling it, like the nondescript male and female figures on restroom signs)..."
3. "the index (something that has a logical and causal relationship with what it represents, how smoke indicates fire because it is a product of fire)..."
4. "the symbol (which refutes both the icon and the index by not resembling or relating to its object in any logical way, how a heart sign – which doesn't resemble an actual heart – is used to signify love.)..."
5. "Essentially then, semiotics allows us to make unspoken leaps, to infer things we aren't told, which makes it a very helpful theory indeed for filmmakers, whose first tenet should always be "show, don't tell."

### **4. The Imaginary Signifier**

1. "Nevertheless, this as it were numerical 'Superiority' disappears if the cinema is compared with the theatre, the opera and other spectacles of the same type. The latter too involve sight and hearing simultaneously, linguistic audition and non-linguistic audition, movement, real temporal progression. Their difference from the cinema lies elsewhere: they do not consist of images, the perceptions they offer to the eye and the ear are inscribed in a true space (not a photographed one), the same one as that occupied by the public during the performance; everything the audience hear and see is actively produced in their presence." (P. 43)
2. "Thus film is like the mirror. But it differs from the primordial mirror in one essential point: although, as in the latter, everything may come to be projected, there is one thing and one thing only that is never reflected in it: the spectator's own body. In a certain emplacement, the mirror suddenly becomes clear glass." (P.45)
3. "In this respect, the cinema is already on the side of the symbolic (which is only to be expected): the spectator knows the objects exist, that he himself exists as a subject, that he becomes an object for others: he knows himself and he knows his like: it is no longer necessary that this similarity be literally depicted for him on the screen" (P.46)

4. "But *with what*, then, does the spectator identify during the projection of the film? For he certainly has to identify: identification in its primal form has ceased to be a current necessity for him, but he continues, in the cinema – if he did not the film would become incomprehensible, considerably more incomprehensible than the most incomprehensible films – to depend on the permanent play of identification without which there would be no social life (thus, the simplest conversation presupposes the alternation of the *I* and the *you*, hence the aptitude of the two interlocutors for a mutual and reversible identification)." (P.46)
5. "The technology of photography carefully conforms to this (banal) phantasy accompanying perception. The camera is 'trained' on the object like a fire-arm (=projection) and the object arrives to make an imprint, a trace, on the receptive surface of the film-strip (=introjection). The spectator himself does not escape these pincers, for he is part of the apparatus, and also because pincers, on the imaginary plane (Melanie Klein), mark our relation to the world as a whole and are rooted in the primary figures of orality." (P.50)

## **5. Feeling and form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key**

1. "Yet, the more one reflects on the significance of art generally, the more the music theory appears as a lead. And the hypothesis certainly suggests itself that the oft-asserted fundamental unity of the arts lies not so much in parallels between their respective elements or analogies among their techniques, as in the singleness of their characteristic import, the meaning of "significance" with respect to any and each of them. "Significant Form" (which really has significance) is the essence of every art; it is what we mean by calling anything "artistic." (P.24)
2. "We may, of course, look for any kind of expression we like, and there is even a fair chance that, whatever it be, we shall find it. A work of art is often a spontaneous expression of feeling, i.e., a symptom of the artist's state of mind. If it represents human beings it is probably also a rendering of some sort of facial expression which suggests the feelings those beings are supposed to have. Moreover, it may be said to "express," in another sense, the life of the society from which it stems, namely to indicate customs, dress, behavior, and to reflect confusion or decorum, violence or peace. And besides all these things it is sure to express the unconscious wishes and nightmares of its author. All these things may be found in museums and galleries if we choose to note them." (P.25)
3. "For in language we find two intellectual functions which it performs at all times, by virtue of its very nature: to fix the pre-eminent factors of experience as entities, by giving them names, and to abstract concepts of relationship, by talking about the named entities. The first process is essentially hypostatic; the second, abstractive. As soon as a name has directed us to a center of interest, there is a thing or a being (in primitive thinking these alternatives are not distinguished) about which the rest of the "specious present" arranges itself. But this arranging is itself reflected in language; for the second process, assertion, which formulates the Gestalt of the complex dominated by a named being, is essentially syntactical;

and the form which language thus impresses on experience is discursive.” (P. 236-237)

4. “The laws of combination, or “logic,” of purely aesthetic forms—be they forms of visible space, audible time, living forces, or experience itself—are the fundamental laws of imagination. They were recognized long ago by poets, who praised them as the wisdom of the heart (much superior to that of the head), and by mystics who believed them to be the laws of “reality.” But, like the laws of literal language, they are really just canons of symbolization; and the systematic study of them was first undertaken by Freud.” (P. 241)
5. “But condensation of symbols is not the same thing as over-determination; it is essentially a fusion of forms themselves by intersection, contraction, elision, suppression, and many other devices. The effect is usually to intensify the created image, heighten the “emotional quality”; often to make one aware of complexities of feeling” (P.244)

## **6. Elements of Semiology**

1. “The institutional and the systematic aspect are of course connected: it is because a language is a system of contractual values (in part arbitrary, or, more exactly, unmotivated) that it resists the modification coming from a single unit, and is consequently a social institution.” (P.14)
2. “The schema, the theory of which merges with that of the form and of the linguistic institution; ii). The group norm-usage-speech, the theory of which merges with that of the substance and of the execution.” (P.18)
3. “Let us first state the element which is common to all these terms: they all necessarily refer us to a relation between two relata. This feature cannot therefore be used to distinguish any of the terms in the series; to find a variation in meaning, we shall have to resort to other features, which will be expressed herein the form of an alternative (presence/absence)” (P.35)
4. “We shall therefore say, with Wallon, that the sign and the index form a group of relata devoid of mental representation, whereas the opposite group, that of symbol and sign, this representation exists; furthermore, the signal is immediate and existential, whereas the index is not (it is only a trace); finally, that in the symbol the representation is analogical and inadequate (Christianity ‘outruns’ the cross), whereas in the sign the relation is unmotivated and exact” (P.38)
5. “For among linguistic signs, we must distinguish between the significant units, each one of which is endowed with one meaning (the ‘words, or to be exact, the ‘monemes’) and which form the first articulation, and the distinctive units, which are part of the form but do not have a direct meaning (“the ‘sounds’, or rather the phonemes), and which constitute the second articulation. It is the double articulation which accounts for the economy of human language; for it is a powerful gearing-down which allows, for instance, American Spanish to produce, with only 21 distinct sounds, 100,000 significant units” (P.39)

## 7. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image

1. “The frame therefore forms a set which has a great number of parts, that is of elements, which themselves form subsets. It can be broken down... This is why Jakobson calls them object-signs, and Pasolini ‘cinemes’...(cinemes would be very like phonemes, and the shot would be like a moneme)” (P.12)
2. “If the frame has an analogue, it is to be found in an information system rather than a linguistics one. The elements are the data, which are sometimes very numerous, sometimes of limited number. The frame is therefore inseparable from two tendencies: towards saturation or towards rarefaction.” (P.12)
3. “Thus movement has two facets, as inseparable as the inside and the outside, as the two sides of a coin: *it is the relationship between parts and it is the state [affection] of the whole*. On the one hand it modifies the respective positions of the parts of a set, which are like its sections [*coupes*], each one immobile in itself; on the other it is itself the mobile section of a whole whose change it expresses. From one point of view, it is called relative; from the other, it is called absolute.” (P.19)
4. “This subdivision is what Pasolini calls a ‘free indirect subjective’. We will say not that the cinema which claim to be objective or subjective – but here something else is at stake: it is a case of going beyond the subjective and the objective towards a pure Form which sets itself up as an autonomous vision of the content. We are no longer faced with subjective or objective images; we are caught in a correlation between a perceptive-image and a camera-consciousness which transforms it” (P.74)
5. “natural and abstract relations... By the first kind, one passes naturally and easily from one image to another: for example from a portrait to its model, then to circumstances in which the portrait was done, then to the place where the model is now, etc. There is this the formation of a succession or habitual series of images. This is, however, not unlimited, for the realization of natural relations is exhausted quickly enough. The second kind of relation, abstract relation, designates on the contrary a circumstance through which one compares two images which are not naturally unified in the mind...Here there is the constitution of a whole, not the formation of a series.” (P.197-198)

## 8. Cinema 2: The Time-Image

1. “The historical fact is that cinema was constituted as such by becoming narrative, by presenting a story, and by rejecting its other possible directions. The approximation which follows is that, from that point, the sequences of images and even each image, a single shot, are assimilated to propositions or rather oral utterances: the shot will be considered as the smallest narrative utterance. Metz himself underlines the hypothetical character of this assimilation” (P.25)
2. “Substituting an utterance for the image, he can and must apply to it certain determinations which do not belong exclusively to the language system [langue], but condition the utterances of a language [langage], even if this language is not verbal and operates independently of a language system.” (P.25)

3. “language features which necessarily apply to utterances will be found in the cinema, as rules of use, in the language system and outside of it: the syntagm (conjunction of present relative units) and the paradigm (disjunction of present units with comparable absent units). The semiology of cinema will be the discipline that applies linguistic models, especially syntagmatic ones, to images as constituting one of their principal 'codes'.” (P.25-26)
4. “From that point on, this narrative utterance necessarily operates through resemblance or analogy, and, in as much as it proceeds through signs, these are 'analogical signs'. Semiology thus needs to have a double transformation: on the one hand the reduction of the image to an analogical sign belonging to an utterance; on the other hand, the codification of these signs in order to discover the (non-analogical) linguistic structure underlying these utterances. Everything will take place between the utterance by analogy, and the 'digital' or digitalized structure of the utterance.” (P.27)
5. “This said, the sign in Peirce apparently combines the three kinds of image, but not in any kind of way: the sign is an image which stands for another image (its object), through the relation of a third image which constitutes 'its interpretant', this in turn being a sign, and so on to infinity” (P.30)

#### New Addition Since First Sources:

##### 1. Yacavone - The Expressive Sign: Cinesemiotics, Enunciation and Screen art

1. “Paradigms , for instance, are sets of functionally equivalent signifying elements. Metz sees them at work in cinema on the micro- level of the image (shot) as consisting of sets of possible cinematic techniques in common use for representing objects: such as different types of shot scale (long shots, medium shots, etc.), types of lighting, types of camera movements, as well as edited transitions between images (straight cuts, wipes, dissolves, etc.). But there are also paradigms that function on a higher level in narrative terms and involve the combination of images into what are commonly referred to as sequences. For Metz, these rather than images, in the form of individual shots, are the smallest basic units of analyzable narrative meaning a film possesses” (P.246)
2. “Metz recognizes that one form of cinematic connotation, which unlike others is clearly under the control of filmmakers, is the figurative and strictly speaking extra- narrative meaning generated as a result of profilmic objects being framed, lit, edited or otherwise shown by filmmakers (like Bresson, in the example above) in unusual and often creatively stylized ways. For Metz, here drawing on Dufrenne’s aesthetics, such deviations from perceptual norms are a major part of the distinctly artistic aspect of film signification rooted in style and aesthetic expressiveness (Metz 1974 , 75– 84). They are a primary means of drawing attention to something about denoted objects, or quite beyond them, in the pursuit of various and in principle unlimited meanings and feelings. Yet creative invention on the connotative plane is not confined to perceptual defamiliarization.” (P.252)

3. “In his *Aesthetics and Psychology of Film*, he argues that the film image, as an intention- laden *analagon* of the object(s) it presents, always has a composite or dual character. Its immediate perceptual content provided by the camera (in the form of an image- object) is always concretely presented through filmic techniques and style in such a way as to call attention to a further dimension of narrative and extra- narrative meaning that is often highly specific to a given film (Mitry 2000a , 51, 72– 88; see also Andrew 1976 ; Yacavone 2015; Lefebvre 2014 ). Thus Mitry asserts that in concrete experience, film images do not have denotation but only connotation. They are always and only encountered as an integrated part of a larger, highly expressive narrative, thematic and aesthetic totality (which he occasionally refers to as alternative “world” on the screen). More than the screenplay, for instance, or what a summary of a film in language could ever capture, this totality is the product of a filmmaker’s style and expressed/ expressive “vision,” sequentially revealed as a film unfolds. For Pasolini, who emphasizes the filmmaker’s creative selection among not just existing physical objects but also already existing transsubjective mental “images” with shared cultural or cross cultural significance (“im- signs”), all filmmaking is rooted in the “common patrimony” of [non- linguistic] signs (Pasolini 1988 , 171). Thus in artistic terms, the creation of the meaningful and expressive whole Mitry analyzes also necessarily involves filmmakers using and modifying all manner of symbolic associations already attached to profilmic objects to a work’s own particular artistic ends (Metz 1974 , 75– 84; Pasolini 1988 ; Yacavone 2015 , 75– 83).” (P.253-254)

## 2. Norman - The Design of Everyday Things

1. “The *Reflective* level is the home of conscious cognition. As a consequence, this is where deep understanding develops, where reasoning and conscious decision-making take place. The visceral and behavior levels are subconscious and, as a result, they respond rapidly, but without much analysis. Reflection is cognitive, deep, and slow. It often occurs after the events have happened. It is a reflection or looking back over them, evaluating the circumstances, actions, and outcomes, often assessing blame or responsibility. The highest level of emotions come from the reflective level, for it is here that causes are assigned and where predictions of the future take place. Adding casual elements to experienced events leads to such emotional states as guilt and pride and blame and praise.” (P. 53)
2. “Semantics is the study of meaning. Semantic constraints are those that rely upon the meaning of the situation to control the set of possible actions. In the case of a motorcycle, there is only one meaningful location for the rider, who must sit facing forward. The purpose of the windshield is to protect the rider’s face, so it must be in the front of the rider. Semantic constraints rely upon our knowledge of the situation and of the world. Such knowledge can be a powerful and important clue. But just as cultural constraints can change with time, so, too, can semantic ones.” (P.129)

## 3. Lakoff - Explaining Embodied Cognition Results

1. “Take my ordinary 1963 baseball example, “Yastrzemski doubled to left.” “To left” is a directional adverb that fits with a moving object. But the sentence, and even its “deep structure,” has no symbolic representation of such an object or



motion. The moving object is the ball, which is understood through the meaning of “double” in baseball. “Field” in “to left field” can only be omitted in the context of a baseball game. The groundskeeper could be “mowing left field,” but not “\*mowing left.” Symbol manipulation without regard to the meaning of the symbols could not work (Lakoff, 1963).” (P.774)

2. “Conceptual metaphors are frame-to-frame mappings, with the roles of the source frame mapping to corresponding roles of the target frame. In conceptual metaphors, source and target frame mappings are not necessarily one to one. In some cases not all roles or role fillers are mapped, and in others metaphorical roles are added to the target domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff & Nuñez, 2000).” (P.776)
  3. “Overall, conceptual metaphors structure a huge amount of our mental lives. They are embodied in two ways: via embodied cognitive primitives that structure the frames in frame-to-frame mappings and via the hundreds of primary metaphors that ground human metaphor systems and more complex metaphors in embodied experience. Via the embodiment of cognitive primitives and primary metaphors abstract (that is, nonphysical) concepts become embodied. The embodied frames may characterize abstract ideas, and the embodied metaphors usually do.” (P.778)
- 4. Lakoff - Women, fire, and dangerous things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind.**
1. “In moving about the world, we automatically categorize people, animals, and physical objects, both natural and man-made. This sometimes leads to the impression that we just categorize things as they are, that things come in natural kinds, and that our categories of mind naturally fit the kinds of things there are in the world. But a large proportion of our categories are not categories of things; they are categories of abstract entities. We categorize events, actions, emotions, spatial relationships, social relationships, and abstract entities of an enormous range: governments, illnesses, and entities in both scientific and folk theories, like electrons and colds. Any adequate account of human thought must provide an accurate theory for all our categories, both concrete and abstract.”
  2. “Reason is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols which are meaningless in themselves, but can be given meaning by virtue of their capacity to refer to things either in the actual world or in possible states of the world. Since the digital computer works by symbol manipulation and since its symbols can be interpreted in terms of a data base, which is often viewed as a partial model of reality, the computer has been taken by many as essentially possessing the capacity to reason.”
- 5. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language**
1. “The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept (e.g., the battling aspects of arguing), a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept which are not coherent with that metaphor. For example, in the midst of a heated argument, where we are intent on attacking our opponent's position and defending our own, we can lose sight of the more cooperative aspects involved in an argument. Someone who is arguing with you can be viewed as giving you his time, a valuable commodity, in an effort at mutual understanding. But

when we are preoccupied with the battle aspects, we will most often lose sight of the cooperative aspects. A far more subtle case of how a metaphorical concept can hide an aspect of our experience can be seen in what Michael Reddy<sup>3</sup> has called the "conduit metaphor." Reddy observes that our language about language is structured roughly by the following complex metaphor: (i) ideas (or meanings) are objects; (ii) linguistic expressions are containers; (iii) communication is sending-the speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea-objects out of the word- containers." (P.459)

2. "First, the LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANINGS aspect of the metaphor entails that words and sentences have meanings in themselves, independent of any context or speaker. The MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS part of the metaphor, for example, entails that meanings have an existence independent of people and contexts. The part of the metaphor that says that LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANING entails that words (and sentences) have meanings, again independent of contexts and speakers. These metaphors are appropriate in many situations-those where context differences don't matter and where all the participants in the conversation understand the sentences in the same way. These two entailments are exemplified by sentences like "The meaning is right there in the words," which, according to the conduit metaphor, can correctly be said of any sentence. But there are many cases where context does matter" (P.459-460)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

### 1. Semiotics

1. "Peirce's seminal work in the field was anchored in pragmatism and logic. He defined a sign as "something which stands to somebody for something," and one of his major contributions to semiotics was the categorization of signs into three main types: (1) an icon, which resembles its referent (such as a road sign for falling rocks); (2) an index, which is associated with its referent (as smoke is a sign of fire); and (3) a symbol, which is related to its referent only by convention (as with words or traffic signals). Peirce also demonstrated that a sign can never have a definite meaning, for the meaning must be continuously qualified."
2. "Saussure treated language as a sign-system, and his work in linguistics supplied the concepts and methods that semioticians applied to sign-systems other than language. One such basic semiotic concept is Saussure's distinction between the two inseparable components of a sign: the signifier, which in language is a set of speech sounds or marks on a page, and the signified, which is the concept or idea behind the sign."
3. "Saussure also distinguished *parole*, or actual individual utterances, from *langue*, the underlying system of conventions that makes such utterances understandable; it is this underlying *langue* that most interests semioticians."
4. "This interest in the structure behind the use of particular signs linked semiotics with the methods of structuralism, which sought to analyze such relations. Saussure's theories were thus also considered fundamental to structuralism (especially structural linguistics) and to poststructuralism."

5. "Her most important contribution to the philosophy of language was her distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic aspects of language. The semiotic, which is manifested in rhythm and tone, is associated with the maternal body. The symbolic, on the other hand, corresponds to grammar and syntax and is associated with referential meaning."

## **2. Signs of Feeling: The American Journal of Semiotics**

1. "Starting at the beginning of her career with the problem of the 'logic' of signs and meanings, and passing, by way of a critique, indeed demolition, of semiotic logocentrism through the semiotics of art, ritual, and myth, Langer arrived at feeling as the heuristic key to mind or minding. The principal questions that Langer forces us to face, and which she tries to answer, are the following. What are we attending to when we attend to feeling? What does the foregrounding of feeling bring to semiotics and to a semiotically relevant image of mind or minding?" (P.45)
2. "Feeling, on Langer's fundamentally naturalist, but non-reductive, conception, characterizes physiological systems, not as an additional 'reality' or ontologically distinct 'level' of reality but as a distinctive lived through dimension or phase of the system. In the cases of physiology and psychology, as understood by Langer, the "overlapping of the two fields is patent" (P.45)
3. "Mentality and feeling, for Langer, are synonymous. Mentality, in the most general sense, is a field of "felt impingements and activities" (1967: 9) and covers not just the normal notion of feeling, but also thought, sensation, dream, and actions — and any other felt modification of the field of consciousness" (P.40)
4. "Feeling may be a 'conceptual' primitive but it is not something 'experientially' primitive, some psychic atom. In spite of her adherence to a principle of continuity, Langer avoids a primitive reductionism as well as a panpsychic reading of 'mind' into nature. For Langer, mentality, in whatever form, is present when there is 'feeling,' a distinctive 'quality' of the live creature, of any sort or grade. The phenomenological task is to sort out its varieties. Langer's project intersects here with the grand project of biosemiotics, linking mentality to type of living body Like biosemiotics, Langer's procedures fuse the biological, the semiotic, and the phenomenological in an inextricable unity with metaphysical and also ethical implications and intentions." (P.46)
5. "The artwork, as an art symbol, Langer says in a remarkable formulation, "reflects the nature of mind as a culmination of life, what it directly exhibits, first of all, is the mysterious quality of intangible elements which arise from the growth and activity of the organism, yet do not seem entirely of its substance" (1967: 230). These intangible elements Langer assimilates to the phenomenon of secondary illusions in art, such as 'color' in music, 'eloquence' in the lines of a sculpture, 'musicality' in the play of colors, 'movement' in the plastic arts, and so forth." (P.57)

## **3. Diegetic Sound and Non-Diegetic Sound**

1. "Diegetic sound is any sound that emanates from the story world of the film. The term comes from the word diegesis, which is the evolution of a Greek term that means narration or narrative... The source of diegetic sound doesn't necessarily need to be seen on screen, as long as the audience understands that it is coming from something within the film."
2. "Non-diegetic sound, also called commentary or nonliteral sound, is any sound that does not originate from within the film's world. The film's characters are not able to hear non-diegetic sound. All non-diegetic sound is added by sound editors in post-production."
3. "When diegetic and non-diegetic sound are combined, it's called trans-diegetic. Trans-diegetic sound refers to any sound that moves in between non-diegetic and diegetic, or vice versa. Trans-diegetic sound helps **bridge or link** two things, like transitions between scenes."
4. "A character hums a tune (diegetic sound) and that humming sound turns into an orchestral version of the same tune (non-diegetic sound), which carries over into the next scene."
5. "**Object sounds** make a film more realistic. For example, if a character walks in the snow, the audience should hear the crunching of their footsteps. If a character is standing on a busy street, we hear the natural ambiance of the city."

#### 4. Classics of Semiotics

1. "The syntagmatic opposition, i.e. the value position which an element takes on within a linear sequence, is therefore especially characteristic for language as a sign system. A typical sign system in the semiology of communication such as a road sign system contains equally rudimentary linear syntagms (e.g. the sequence of pre-warning and warning signs). As a rule, however, nonlinguistic sign systems are based on spatial syntagmatics (for example adjacency on a surface)." (P.73)
2. "The coordination between signifier and signified in the sign as a whole may also be based on arbitrariness. There is no reason one can think of why the same concept, say, "housing device," should be coupled in one language with the signifier /house/, in another with the signifier /Maison/. As has been suggested before, however, there exist relationships between signifier and signified which are "motivated" to different degrees, meaning that "there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified" (Saussure, 1964)" (P.74)
3. "For Barthes, the connotation is the "tone" of a text, the manner in which it has been "doctored"... the signified of a "connotative sign" is for Barthes the "fragment of an ideology," the signifier, in turn, a "rhetoric," both going back to a "real system" via metalanguage." (P.75)
4. "What Barthes investigates are not signs of communication; he looks perhaps at symbols, but mostly at indices of sociological phenomena – certain manners of preparing food, of dressing, styles of furniture, cars, architecture, etc. Even for unequivocally communicative processes such as photography and film, Barthes is not interested in the specific semiological investigation of these media as sign systems" (P.81)

5. “While structural linguistics, as a part of the semiology postulated by de Saussure, investigates natural languages as a system of signs, in structuralism, instead, methods and terms of structural linguistics are generalized a priori and applied to the realm of non-linguistic signs pertaining to the semiology of communication, and especially to the realm of indices in the semiology of signification.” (P.82)

### New Addition Since First Sources:

#### 1. Mambrol - Christian Metz and Film Theory

1. Metz’s early essays thus reflect on the notion that film in general is a specific kind of illusion, one that is undeniably successful in seducing the spectator into suspending disbelief. Once immersed in the film world, once having accepted the principle that film is an illusion, or an ‘impression’ of reality, the image assumes all its seductive power. To present film largely from the spectator’s position, as we have done here, is, however, to move too quickly. For Metz’s early essays were less focused on film as experienced by the spectator (this focus would come later with a [psychoanalytic study of cinema](#)), and more on the way film signifies. In particular, Metz was interested in the way the film signifier, by comparison with other media – other signifiers – succeeds in presenting a narrative (diegesis), intrigue, description, drama, etc. The key point here concerns the way film as such presents a narrative structure, and not the way specific films unfold and may be interpreted in light of this unfolding. In other words, the point is not to interpret (particular) films (in which case the film signifier becomes incidental), but to analyze film as a structure of signification.
2. To say that a feature film – a film of fiction – unfolds by way of a narrative structure, is to say that it is a discourse, and thus, as Benveniste said, is an enunciation (énonciation) enacted by a subject of enunciation (sujet de l’énonciation) – or by, as Metz prefers, a ‘narrating agency’ (instance racontante). In effect, film images are always organized in a specific way; they are never simply given in a raw, descriptive form, although, to be sure, descriptive sequences can occur within the film diegesis. As a discourse, then, film has to be understood in terms of parole – or process – rather than langue – or system. On the other hand, Metz argues that film images correspond to statements (énoncés), or speech acts, rather than to words, precisely because, unlike words, images are of indefinite number and are created by the film-maker/ speaker. Furthermore, film is not a language (langue) but an art of both connotation (unlike music or architecture) and expressivity (it uses natural objects which do not invoke a code). While ‘a concept signifies, a thing is expressive’, Metz points out (Metz 1974: 78. Translation modified).
3. Metz thus employs the key [Lacanian](#) concepts of the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘symbolic’ to explain the logic of the spectator’s fascination with the image. Thus through an evocation of [Lacan](#)’s ‘Mirror Stage’, Metz sees the spectator’s captivation by the image as being equivalent to the child’s identification of itself with its image in the mirror. Most importantly, this identification is pleasurable, a factor reinforced by the cinema institution’s encouragement of the spectator. Clearly, the cinema institution has a vested interest in ensuring that the spectator

experiences any individual film as a – to use Kleinian terms – ‘good object’: the object of fantasy that often forms the basis of a pleasant day-dream. A ‘bad object’, by contrast, is what the subject/spectator wants to avoid. The spectator, then, has assimilated the positive cue associated with going to the cinema institution because he or she is part of that very institution. This is to say that the subject’s imaginary is an integral part of the same institution. Film, in effect, becomes integrated into the subject’s desire. The screen becomes equivalent to a mirror which offers an image of the subject’s own desire. Because the cinema is structured in this way, Metz shows, discourse on the cinema is often part of the cinema institution. Only rarely, therefore, is cinema discourse critical of the cinema institution.

**2. Robbins - Modularity of Mind – (use as a counter argument)**

1. “A cognitive system is informationally encapsulated to the extent that in the course of processing a given set of inputs it cannot access information stored elsewhere; all it has to go on is the information contained in those inputs plus whatever information might be stored within the system itself, for example, in a proprietary database.”
2. “A system is domain specific to the extent that it has a restricted subject matter, that is, the class of objects and properties that it processes information about is circumscribed in a relatively narrow way. As Fodor (1983) puts it, “domain specificity has to do with the range of questions for which a device provides answers (the range of inputs for which it computes analyses)” (p. 103): the narrower the range of inputs a system can compute, the narrower the range of problems the system can solve—and the narrower the range of such problems, the more domain specific the device. Alternatively, the degree of a system’s domain specificity can be understood as a function of the range of inputs that turn the system on, where the size of that range determines the informational reach of the system (Carruthers, 2006; Samuels, 2000).”

**3. Wilson, R., & Foglia, L. - Embodied Cognition**

1. “**Embodiment Thesis:** Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing.”
2. “Embodied cognitive science appeals to the idea that cognition deeply depends on aspects of the agent's body other than the brain. Without the involvement of the body in both sensing and acting, thoughts would be empty, and mental affairs would not exhibit the characteristics and properties they do. Work on embedded cognition, by contrast, draws on the view that cognition deeply depends on the natural and social environment. By focusing on the strategies organisms use to off-load cognitive processing onto the environment, this work places particular emphasis on the ways in which cognitive activity is distributed across the agent and her physical, social, and cultural environment (Suchman 1987, Hutchins 1995). The thesis of extended cognition is the claim that cognitive systems themselves extend beyond the boundary of the individual organism. On this view,

features of an agent's physical, social, and cultural environment can do more than distribute cognitive processing: they may well partially constitute that agent's cognitive system. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, R. Wilson 2004; A. Clark 2008, Menary 2010).”

3. “At the heart of the traditional scientific understanding of cognition lies a particular conception of mental representation (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Newell and Simon 1972). This conception claims that representations are symbolic structures with quasi-linguistic and combinatorial properties, act as vehicles of contents, and are what are primarily appealed to in explaining intelligent behavior. Mental representations are symbolic and abstract in that the same representation, such as “table” is used to mean different kinds of table. They are amodal in that the same representation can be employed when “table” is written or spoken about. Such representations are arbitrarily related to their referents because the way in which they are formed and deployed, along with their characteristics, bears no relationship to the physical and functional features of the referents. Thus, on the traditional view, not only are the internal representations employed in language, concept formation, and memory essentially distinct from those processed by the sensorimotor system, but their meaning is divorced from bodily experience.”